In most legal orders, human germline modification is either prohibited or severely restricted. A recurring thought in these legal frameworks is that heritable genome editing would result in practices that are at odds with principles of human rights, such as dignity, justice, and equality. However, now that CRISPR is bringing heritable genome editing within human reach, the question has risen as to whether these human rights bans still make sense. The call is growing louder to lift the ban on heritable genome editing for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe for introduction in the clinic. This article critically examines these recent proposals from a human rights perspective. First, it examines the question as to how realistic the proposed distinction between the therapeutic and the nontherapeutic uses of human germline modification is in the CRISPR era. Second, it argues that these proposals rely on a one-dimensional understanding of the meaning of human rights for this issue. Finally, it suggests that this one dimensional understanding paves the way for a regime of self-regulation by the scientific community that leaves little room for public debate on the question as to whether or how human germline modification fits in the long term aspirations of society.
KEYWORDS: assisted reproductive technologies, CRISPR, human dignity, human germline gene editing, human nuclear genome transfer, human rights
Technologies based in machine learning and artificial technology play a growing role in
modern societies, altering existing social dynamics or even introducing new modes of
interpersonal interaction. Those changes become relevant for legal philosophy as they
transform social relations that are regulated by law or the ways in which legal systems
function, for instance through the automation of tasks currently performed by judges,
lawyers, and other legal actors. But, at the same time that artificial intelligence can present
legal philosophy with new questions, it can also enable new approaches for the study of
complex social relations and their impacts in legal philosophy. In this paper, I propose
questions and approaches to enable a dialogue between legal philosophy and artificial
intelligence research that can be fruitful for both fields and for the social roles played by law.
The history lessons do not produce a complete road map for
responding to each new law and technology issue — such a
guide is not achievable considering the vast variety of
technological change. But the lessons do provide a number of
useful guidelines for how to confront novel law and technology
challenges. In this symposium article, I propose three lessons:
(1) that preexisting legal categories may no longer apply for
new law and technology issues; (2) that decision-makers be
careful to avoid being blinded by the marvels of new technology
in deciding law and technology cases; and (3) that the types of
new law and technology disputes can be unforeseeable. These
are just three examples of useful lessons; they are not intended
to be a comprehensive list, and more suggestions are welcome.
Critically for any discussion of a general theory of law and
technology, I contend that these guidelines are applicable
across a wide variety of technologies, even those that we cannot
conceive of presently.
This Article is about "authorship," which is arguably the most central, and certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with Anglo-American copyright doctrine. But discussions of copyright doctrine tend to assume the importance of "authorship" as a privileged category of human enterprise, rather than to examine where this notion arose or how it has influenced the law. In what follows, I try to show how copyright received a constructed idea of "authorship" from literary and artistic culture and to explore ways -sometimes peculiar and even perverse ways- in which this "authorship construct" has been mobilized in legal discourse.
The Article begins with a discussion of the limitations of conventional structuralist analysis to make sense of the confusion of copyright doctrine. It moves away from the consideration of the structure of that doctrine to confront "authorship" in a series of contextualized "close readings." I point out how the "authorship" concept has operated to conceal, rather than to reveal, the actual stakes in the ongoing discussions of "literary property" and how the multiple functions of "authorship" continue to generate incoherence in copyright doctrine. I then discuss how "authorship" has been continually revived and redeployed, sometimes under very unusual circumstances, in debates about the doctrinal features of copyright protection. Finally, I explain the unusual power and persistence of "authorship," demonstrating that far from being a non-controversial, generalized "source" of copyright doctrine, it in fact is the specific locus of a basic contradiction between public access to and private control over imaginative creations. This inquiry into "authorship" aims to demonstrate the tension between two different visions of the individual's place in the community-one a characteristic of early modem, pre-industrial social thought and the other associated with postindustrial ideology.
Today, many areas of our daily lives are determined by artificial intelligence (AI). Machines
program software, translate texts rapidly, create beautiful images, and design fashion efficiently.
They are capable of superhuman performances. Furthermore, machines make the impression of
boundless creativity. AI’s achievements in traditional areas of copyright subject matters
inevitably raise the question of legal protection through an exclusive right. This Article begins
by exploring AI technology’s various accomplishments (Introduction). Then, in Part I, it
outlines the legal status quo with respect to those developments. And Part II discusses potential
copyright protection, mainly from the perspective of creativity. Finally, Part III, IV, and V
address other arguments regarding copyright protection for AI products, such as the economic
aspects of incentive and market failure. This Article contemplates the issue from an international
perspective and concludes that neither copyright nor other similar protection rights, i.e. sui
generis rights (which already exist for different subject matters, for example, in Europe), should
be implemented. This finding holds true regardless of the legal jurisdiction, may it be common
law or civil law.
Artificial intelligence has been generating inventive output for decades, and now the continued and exponential growth in computing power is poised to take creative machines from novelties to major drivers of economic growth. In some cases, a computer’s output constitutes patentable subject matter, and the computer rather than a person meets the requirements for inventorship. Despite this, and despite the fact that the Patent Office has already granted patents for inventions by computers, the issue of computer inventorship has never been explicitly considered by the courts, Congress, or the Patent Office. Drawing on dynamic principles of statutory interpretation and taking analogies from the copyright context, this Article argues that creative computers should be considered inventors under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Treating nonhumans as inventors would incentivize the creation of intellectual property by encouraging the development of creative computers. This Article also addresses a host of challenges that would result from computer inventorship, including the ownership of computer-based inventions, the displacement of human inventors, and the need for consumer protection policies. This analysis applies broadly to nonhuman creators of intellectual property, and explains why the Copyright Office came to the wrong conclusion with its Human Authorship Requirement. Finally, this Article addresses how computer inventorship provides insight into other areas of patent law. For instance, computers could replace the hypothetical skilled person that courts use to judge inventiveness. Creative computers may require a rethinking of the baseline standard for inventiveness, and potentially of the entire patent system.
I have recently shared two articles about artificial intelligence and intellectual property law. What do you think about AI creativity? Can an AI be creative, or it is a phenomenon of the human brain, and no other creature is capable of creating. You may want to have a look at the following websites before commenting: https://aiva.ai/https://www.nextrembrandt.com/https://generated.photos/
Music, creativity, and computers: what could these possibly have to do with one another? “Nothing!,” many people would say. Creativity is a marvel of the human mind, and music is a special case. But computers, with all due apologies to Mario, Sonic, and friends, are basically just tincans. It follows—doesn’t it?—that creativity (whether musical or not) and computers are related only by utter incompatibility.
Well, no. Computers and creativity make interesting partners with respect to two different projects. One, which interests me the most, is understanding human creativity. The other is trying to produce machine creativity—or anyway, machine “creativity”—in which the computer at least appears to be creative, to some degree.
This article reviews how Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can be protected under three IP frameworks: copyright, patent and—taking IP in its broader sense—trade secrets laws. In contrast to other contributions, the focus of this work is how the AI system itself is protected, not its output. AI systems are primarily protected as trade secrets, as attempts to protect AI systems under copyright and patent laws encounter difficulties. In copyright law, algorithms are excluded from protection under the EU Software Directive. They also struggle to meet the author’s own intellectual creation criterion, in addition to not necessarily being a creative expression of said creation. Acquiring patents for AI systems is also difficult as these systems may fail to satisfy the technical character and inventive step requirements. However, although trade secrets law is the most common avenue to IP protection, an alternative and increasingly successful route is to patent AI systems as computer-implemented inventions. The impact of trade secret protection for AI systems in terms of transparency and accountability is also discussed. Because trade secret protection subsists for as long as the information remains confidential and requires actors to take steps to ensure confidentiality, trade secret protection facilitates algorithmic opacity. This has serious consequences.
How should hyperlinks to works protected by copyright be treated under the EU copyright
law framework, specifically under the right of communication to the public (the RCTTP)
located in Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29 (InfoSoc Directive)?
While a couple of high-profile copyright cases offered an opportunity for the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) to answer this question, decisions handed down by it have
increased the uncertainty surrounding the concept of the RCTTP and hyperlinking. Thus, the
question whether hyperlinking to a copyright-protected work on the Internet is “a
communication to the public” in the sense of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive has become
one of the controversial issues in EU copyright law. This paper aims to examine the scope of
the EU copyright law regarding hyperlinking and of one exclusive right of authors, the
RCTTP. Firstly, it focuses on the nature and scope of the RCTTP and examines briefly the
sources of and justifications for this right at both an international and an EU level. Secondly,
it sets out the CJEU’s interpretation of the RCTTP regarding hyperlinking. Then that
interpretation is criticised in the light of four main criteria stated by the CJEU. Finally, some
possible approaches to hyperlinking under EU copyright law are suggested by the author. In
general, he would not consider hyperlinks as an “act of communication” within the meaning
of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive because they do not transmit a work or make it
available to the public. He argues that, rather than broadening the RCTTP beyond its
original scope and intent, it would be better to revise Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive or to
develop appropriate, harmonised rules of indirect infringement or unfair competition law
that protect right holders against unfair hyperlinking practices.