Large scientific projects in genomics and astronomy are influential not because they answer any single question but because they enable investigation of continuously arising new questions from the same data-rich sources. Advances in automated mapping of the brain's synaptic connections (connectomics) suggest that the complicated circuits underlying brain function are ripe for analysis. We discuss benefits of mapping a mouse brain at the level of synapses.
Technologies based in machine learning and artificial technology play a growing role in
modern societies, altering existing social dynamics or even introducing new modes of
interpersonal interaction. Those changes become relevant for legal philosophy as they
transform social relations that are regulated by law or the ways in which legal systems
function, for instance through the automation of tasks currently performed by judges,
lawyers, and other legal actors. But, at the same time that artificial intelligence can present
legal philosophy with new questions, it can also enable new approaches for the study of
complex social relations and their impacts in legal philosophy. In this paper, I propose
questions and approaches to enable a dialogue between legal philosophy and artificial
intelligence research that can be fruitful for both fields and for the social roles played by law.
Many want to know what bitcoin is and how it works. But bitcoin is as complex as it is controversial, and relatively few have the technical background to understand it. In this paper, I offer an accessible on-ramp for understanding bitcoin in the form of a model. My model reveals both what bitcoin is and how it works. More specifically, it reveals that bitcoin is a fictional substance in a massively coauthored story on a network that automates and distributes jobs normally entrusted to centralized publishing institutions. My model therefore falsifies a popular view according to which each bitcoin is a chunk of code.
Grand neuroscience projects, such as connectomics, have a recurrent tendency to overpromise and underdeliver. Here I critically assess what is done in contrast with what is claimed about such endeavors, especially when the results are “horizontal” and the conclusions “vertical”, namely, when maps of one level (synaptic connections) are conflated with mappings between levels (neural function, animal behavior, cognitive processes). I argue that to suggest that connectomics will give us the mind of a mouse, a human or even a fly is conceptually flawed. Even if we, neuroscientists, do not take our metaphors literally, we should take them seriously.
This Article is about "authorship," which is arguably the most central, and certainly the most resonant, of the foundational concepts associated with Anglo-American copyright doctrine. But discussions of copyright doctrine tend to assume the importance of "authorship" as a privileged category of human enterprise, rather than to examine where this notion arose or how it has influenced the law. In what follows, I try to show how copyright received a constructed idea of "authorship" from literary and artistic culture and to explore ways -sometimes peculiar and even perverse ways- in which this "authorship construct" has been mobilized in legal discourse.
The Article begins with a discussion of the limitations of conventional structuralist analysis to make sense of the confusion of copyright doctrine. It moves away from the consideration of the structure of that doctrine to confront "authorship" in a series of contextualized "close readings." I point out how the "authorship" concept has operated to conceal, rather than to reveal, the actual stakes in the ongoing discussions of "literary property" and how the multiple functions of "authorship" continue to generate incoherence in copyright doctrine. I then discuss how "authorship" has been continually revived and redeployed, sometimes under very unusual circumstances, in debates about the doctrinal features of copyright protection. Finally, I explain the unusual power and persistence of "authorship," demonstrating that far from being a non-controversial, generalized "source" of copyright doctrine, it in fact is the specific locus of a basic contradiction between public access to and private control over imaginative creations. This inquiry into "authorship" aims to demonstrate the tension between two different visions of the individual's place in the community-one a characteristic of early modem, pre-industrial social thought and the other associated with postindustrial ideology.
Names play a significant role in the development of the characters and cultures of the imaginary worlds envisioned by science fiction and fantasy authors. Rather than creating new languages, as J. R. R. Tolkien does in The Lord of the Rings, Frank Herbert accomplishes his world-building in Dune by choosing existing names that evoke a recognizable medieval, feudal setting and depict a desert planet inhabited by a quasi-Arabic and Islamic tribal people. Although names serve to juxtapose the Fremen as an exotic Other with the Western Atreides family, they also gesture towards a possible re-envisioning of this polarized relationship.
I have recently shared two articles about artificial intelligence and intellectual property law. What do you think about AI creativity? Can an AI be creative, or it is a phenomenon of the human brain, and no other creature is capable of creating. You may want to have a look at the following websites before commenting: https://aiva.ai/https://www.nextrembrandt.com/https://generated.photos/
Link to article: https://iep.utm.edu/ethic-ai/“This article provides a comprehensive overview of the main ethical issues related to the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on human society. AI is the use of machines to do things that would normally require human intelligence. In many areas of human life, AI has rapidly and significantly affected human society and the ways we interact with each other. It will continue to do so. Along the way, AI has presented substantial ethical and socio-political challenges that call for a thorough philosophical and ethical analysis. Its social impact should be studied so as to avoid any negative repercussions. AI systems are becoming more and more autonomous, apparently rational, and intelligent. This comprehensive development gives rise to numerous issues. In addition to the potential harm and impact of AI technologies on our privacy, other concerns include their moral and legal status (including moral and legal rights), their possible moral agency and patienthood, and issues related to their possible personhood and even dignity. It is common, however, to distinguish the following issues as of utmost significance with respect to AI and its relation to human society, according to three different time periods: (1) short-term (early 21st century): autonomous systems (transportation, weapons), machine bias in law, privacy and surveillance, the black box problem and AI decision-making; (2) mid-term (from the 2040s to the end of the century): AI governance, confirming the moral and legal status of intelligent machines (artificial moral agents), human-machine interaction, mass automation; (3) long-term (starting with the 2100s): technological singularity, mass unemployment, space colonisation.”
In this article, we argue that the animated TV-show Rick and Morty depicts several important and relevant themes about the impact of technology in contemporary societies. By using certain concepts and ideas from the philosophy of technology, especially from thinkers like Jacques Ellul, Jacques Derrida, Neil Postman, and George Ritzer, we investigate how this show brings to the fore certain ontological and ethical assumptions and problems that stem from the advance of technology. We shall use the term technopolitical thinking to refer to these core assumptions and principles which are inherent in contemporary technological societies. By providing various examples from certain episodes and scenes of the show, we shall illustrate how this animated series can provide a basis for a more extensive discussion.
In this article, we describe what cryptocurrency is, how it works, and how it relates to familiar conceptions of and questions about money. We then show how normative questions about monetary policy find new expression in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. These questions can play a role in addressing not just what money is, but what it should be. A guiding theme in our discussion is that progress here requires a mixed approach that integrates philosophical tools with the purely technical results of disciplines like computer science and economics.